Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts permit negotiation between agency and interest group plaintiff in designing remedies, it is very difficult for a legislature to enforce statutory constraints via judicial oversight and to stem this form of policy drift.
agency at all (Banks and Weingast 1992). 4 In fact, the drift historically observed in structural reform cases often occurs through changes in the constellation and litigation capacity of interest groups in a particular policy area. 5 Seeking ex post redress from litigation-induced drift is costly and consequently rare. In a separate paper, we more precisely explore the tradeoffs involved in such enforcement issues (Bertelli and Feldmann 2003) .
Structural reform suits typically begin at the street level: The legal rights of an agency's client are violated by an official, e.g., an inmate is subjected to serious physical abuse by a prison guard. After investigation, a lawyers' group-an interest group such as the American Civil Liberties Union-collects the claims of various aggrieved clients into a class action against the agency. If the court finds for the plaintiffs or the defendant agency agrees to settle, remedial changes in agency structure and process are negotiated, or in extreme cases-as when federal judges met with recalcitrant administrators over school desegregation-ordered.
Remedies in these cases typically take the form of a consent decree, a quasi-contract negoti- 4 Litigation addressing inequitable conditions in Southern prisons during the 1970s is illustrative. State legislatures were reluctant to address the issue, as it was inextricably linked to race discrimination (Feeley and Rubin 1998) . While legislators might have sought to claim credit for improving conditions for minority prisoners, they shunned the public debate of race relations. Moreover, the legislatures probably never seriously considered closing all of the prisons-the equivalent of rescinding the delegation. Thus, the legislatures did act to supersede the outcomes of structural reform litigation. Recent moves to privatize prisons are a potential legislative response, but it was not widely employed by Southern legislatures at the time. ated by the plaintiffs and agency approved by the court. This judicial approval requirement will play an important role in our analysis.
The model that follows illuminates the strategies of plaintiffs and administrative agencies in cases such as the following:
• In 1987, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri ordered salary increases for teachers and staff in the Kansas City Metropolitan School District (KCMSD) as one portion of a vast desegregation remedy (Joondeph 1996, 622) . KCMSD had difficulty in producing the funds to comply with this judicial prescription, and it so advised the court. Under
Missouri law, the capacity for local governments to increase property taxes was restricted. Nevertheless, the District Court ordered property taxes in the KCMSD to be raised from $2.05 to $4.00 per $100 in assessed value. The
United States Supreme Court held that though the District Court could not order the tax increase itself, "it could have authorized or required KCMSD to levy property taxes at a rate adequate to fund the desegregation remedy and could have enjoined the operation of state laws that would have prevented KCMSD from exercising this power" (Jenkins v. Missouri, 495 U.S. 33, 51, 1990 ).
• Jess McDonald, director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS, the state's child welfare agency), and the American Civil Liberties Union, plaintiffs' attorney in a structural reform suit known as B.H.,
were accused of collusion by a member of the Illinois Senate. After a consent decree was in place that held the agency to a significant expansion in service provision, then-Illinois State Senator Peter Fitzgerald publicly stated his sus-picion that DCFS had solicited pressure tactics and threats to seek contempt citations from the plaintiffs' attorneys. As a countermeasure, Fitzgerald proposed a Bill, which was approved and signed by Governor Edgar to become Public Act 89-645 on August 9, 1996, requiring the Attorney General to notify both the House Speaker and the Senate President before entering into any remedial agreement "whose initial or cumulative effect will require or involve the appropriation or expenditure of $10 million or more" (Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, August 12, 1996) .
Judicial power over agency resources is crucial to the incentives discussed in this paper.
Courts do not, in principle, order the spending of public funds. Rather, they suggest that such funds must be appropriated, or that the government, through legislative enactment, must cease providing the particular service or program in question. . By contrast, our model demonstrates that none of these conditions is necessary in order for legislative policy choices to be systematically diverted from intended outcomes. To this end, our model assumes judicial preferences to be policy neutral. 6 We argue that the prevalence of bargaining and interest representation in public law litigation, rather than judicial ideology, offers interest groups a technology for influencing policy making that can be more fruitful than lobbying.
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The following section presents a spatial Rubinstein bargaining model, and is followed by a discussion of its results. The paper concludes with some empirical implications.
The Model
An administrative agency, conceived as a unitary agent, is charged with implementing a statute. For simplicity, we assume that the agency chooses the allocation of two administrative inputs, p and q, which together constitute its policy choice. One dimension (q) may be quantifiable and is easily defined ex ante, monitored, and enforced, while the second dimension (p) is more difficult to specify for all contingencies and harder to verify by objective standards ex post. We will refer to the p dimension as the "process" by which the agency implements the statute, while the q dimension may be thought of as personnel and budget available to the task, i.e., as the resources appropriated by the legislature for the agency.
Process may be costly for the agency to provide as it requires effort. Both "process" and "quantifiable" inputs, (p, q), are required for an agency to fulfill its mandate, and the result of their choice produces an outcome according to some (possibly stochastic) policy production function, such as the placement of a child within foster care no later than 24 hours after referral to a social services office, the provision of physical and mental health to inmates, or the maintenance of safety and order in a community.
The agency's enabling statute defines a range of discretion, i.e., a range of permissible (p, q) from which the agency is to choose its policy. In principle, the range of discretion could be an arbitrary set in R 2 , though we assume that the legislature constrains p and q separately and independently of each other. Thus, the statute specifies a "window" of p ∈ [p,p] and q ∈ [q,q] from the agency may choose its policy.
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For simplicity, we consider only one "quantifiable" and "process" dimension, respectively, though the implementation of policy may involve much more than the choice of, say, budget outlays and effort of public service provision (process). The extension of our argument to a more complex choice environment should be straightforward. The key for the process dimension is that the agency has some de facto degree of discretion-regardless of the legislature's intent. The agency may be explicitly given some discretion to determine policy. However, questions of whether the agency's exercise of discretion falls within the scope of its mandate and complies with Constitutional provisions can often only be addressed ex post, as in the case of structural reform litigation.
Since we are concerned with the inputs to policymaking p and q, we consider the induced preferences over the various combinations of (p, q) ∈ R 2 + and make the standard assumptions about preferences common in spatial modeling: the agency and a unitary-actor plaintiff have (induced) preferences over the input choices that are strictly convex, continuous, differentiable, and are satiated at the agency's ideal point A = (p a , q a ) and the plaintiff's ideal point
), respectively.
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We make the following simplifying assumption about preferences: Assumption A1:
Preferences are Euclidean and are represented by utility functions u a (x) = −d(x − A) and
is a strictly increasing function of the Euclidean distance.
This implies that preferences are separable in the two dimensions so that the preferred level q = q a is independent of p, and vice versa. This assumption is stronger than necessary for most of our results, and we weaken it suitably below.
Since p is an arbitrary process dimension, we consider without loss of generality the level of p to be positively related to the level of services provided to the agency's clients. We thus make the following plausible assumptions about the location of ideal points in order to limit the cases to be considered: insufficient to satisfy either the agency or the plaintiff: min{q a , q g } >q.
We distinguish two revealing preference configurations. In the first case, the agency considers the quantifiable input q to be mainly a private good, providing benefits to its staff and management by alleviating odious tasks, increasing leisure or prestige, such as stateof-the-art administrative technology, employment of more bureaucrats, or funds for subcontracting tasks to consultants, and so forth. 10 Consequently, the agency generally prefers a larger q to a smaller one up to some level, and only when q is very large do responsibilities such as the supervision of consultants and administration of equipment offset the agency's private benefit. Given Euclidean preferences, larger q can compensate the agency for higher levels of p in the range where q < q a and p > p a . The plaintiff, on the other hand, only marginally benefits from these additional q, and its ideal q consequently is smaller than that desired by the agency: q a > q g .
In the second case, the quantifiable input q is by and large a public good that primarily benefits the agency's clients, such as a larger budget for direct payments or services. Larger q directly improve the quality of client services, while creating only marginal benefit for the agency. Thus, we have q a < q g . 10 In this case of q as a private good, the reader may be reminded of Niskanen's (1971; 1975 ) models of agency production, in which agencies are assumed to be budget-maximizers and have no interest in policy per se. Those models have been seriously criticized in the political science literature (e.g., Miller and Moe 1983, Conybeare 1984; Bendor 1988 ). In contrast, we assume that the agency is ultimately interested in policy outcomes and considers the implied trade-offs of its input choice. We follow the convention of satiated (i.e., ideal point) preferences over policy dimensions; if the "private good" nature of q is close to pure, the satiation point q a can be thought to be very high.
Before Bargaining: Agenda Setting and Initiation
Since the the quantifiable input is easily monitored and enforced, its appropriation creates a legislatively generated hard constraint on the agency's policy choice: only combinations in B = {(p, q) ∈ R 2 | q ≤q} are feasible. Assumption 2(iii) assures that the constraint is binding.
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In the absence of any further constraints the agency maximizes its utility subject to the budget constraint and choosesx
Since preferences (under A1) are separable and (under A2(iii)) input-constrained, the agency chooses its preferred process and exhausts the entire quantifiable input permitted under the statute:x = (p a ,q).
If the legislature wants to induce a different (i.e., higher) process choice, it may specify the mandate p > p a (as assumed in A2(ii)) and rely on the courts to enforce compliance. Of course, the legislature may also control the agency, either directly by "policing" its policies or indirectly, using a "fire alarm" mechanism in which interest groups report agency underperformance to an oversight committee ( In contrast, we are presently interested in judicially enforced constraints. The legislature specifies a minimum process, or a minimum level of services provided to the client population.
11 A sufficient assumption about the shape of preferences is Assumption A1 : preferences are strictly convex and input-constrained, i.e., given quantifiable inputq set by the legislative mandate, for all p, ∃ε > 0
Underperformance relative to this mandated level, however, does not automatically trigger a sanction; for the constraint to have any effect, an interest group or client group of the agency needs to file suit for violation of the mandate.
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The set of legal choices is L = {(p, q) | p ≤ p ≤p}, and choices outside L generate a potential case for a law suit. 13 By allegedly violating its statutes the agency creates a justiciable claim for an injured party. Given standing, the prospective plaintiff will sue if litigation introduces a sufficient probability that, as a result of the suit, the agency will be forced to choose a higher p.
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We assume that plaintiff and agency have common knowledge of relevant case, statutory, and constitutional law (i.e., of the set L). Though the court must determine the precise process the agency must follow in order to comply with the law, the parties have expectations of this judicial determination that create a constraint on any bargaining done in the negotiation stage. We abstract from this potential uncertainty by treating the legal constraint as deterministic. 15 Thus, the judge simply applies L to the bargains like an automaton, ruling 12 Whether the chosen process is in compliance with the agency's enabling statute and the relevant constitutional provisions is a "issue of fact." As a simplification, we assume that agency and plaintiff-interest group have no uncertainty about the interpretation of the statute and the process-requirement a judge would impose. In other words, we assume away any "issues of law."
13 It is clear that by A2(ii) the agency will never choose p >p and that only the lower bound is binding;
we will therefore ignore the upper bound constraint in the remainder of our analysis. In some cases this condition might place an additional constraint on the bargaining outcome.
14 A controversy is justiciable if it is appropriate for judicial determination, as opposed to contingent, hypothetical, or abstract. Standing requires that a plaintiff have in fact suffered a harm such that it would be proper to grant it the relief sought. 15 Recall that the judge is considered policy neutral in our model. Courts interpret the whether the agency's any offer in L as acceptable under the law and rejecting any offer outside of L as violating the statute.
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If the plaintiff decides to sue, the parties begin settlement negotiations at the invitation of the judge. If the parties are recalcitrant and refuse to cooperate, the judge, for lack of more detailed knowledge about the policy, determines the level of p and issues an injunction forcing the agency to comply at the prevailingq. 17 This outcome, c = (p,q), constitutes the default outcome, or disagreement point, of the bargaining that will ensue.
The agency is, of course, worse off at c than atx. programs." The agency would use the crisis technique to achieve q a by demonstrating for the legislature that a court would compel it to operate at point c, which, it would argue, is either infeasible or would divert resources away from other activities in the agency's portfolio valued by the legislature. The crisis budgeting argument relies upon the fact that the court process choice violates a plaintiff's legal rights, and do not consider a lack of resources to be a valid defense. 16 If, as in the judicial politics literature, judges are considered ideological, any known bias would simply affect the location of the commonly perceived legal constraint. 17 In practice, the option of a structural injunction without the agency's cooperation constitutes a last resort after lesser forms of reform and supervision have failed. Accordingly, we consider the threat of receivership as one example of an outcome that occurs when bargaining breaks down. Where exactly the outcome under receivership lies is irrelevant for the model, as long as this outcome is not on the Pareto set between agency and plaintiff.
and legislature do not make the same tradeoffs when determining agency priorities.
If the legislature responds to the crisis, litigation may be averted. 18 If not, the trial and negotiation stages ensue. Bargaining over remedy is prompted by a finding (or expected finding) of agency liability. We assume that this condition is satisfied and turn to the negotiation of the remedy to be embodied in a consent decree.
Alternate-Offer Bargaining With Judicial Approval
We model remedial negotiation in structural reform cases as an alternating-offer bargaining game between the litigants subject to court approval. 19 The game proceeds as follows: The agency moves first, presenting a remedial plan x ∈ R 2 , which the plaintiff may accept or reject. 20 If the plaintiff accepts, x is presented to the judge. The judge approves x as the 18 Due to established legal doctrine noted above, the legislature has the same Hobson's choice at the threat of suit as it does upon the realization of suit. It may refuse to respond to a prelitigation threat, since nothing with the force of a court order-a consent decree-is in place; however, if a suit is imminent, the legislature cannot avoid the foreseeable remedial action. 19 The seminal works on bilateral alternating-offer bargaining are the finite horizon game of Ståhl (1972) that converges to the infinite horizon model of Rubinstein (1982) . 20 In many structural reform cases, a state attorney general acts as counsel for the agency (though some private counsel is retained), and in virtually every case must approve the consent decree on behalf of the state. Our agency presents, accepts and rejects offers directly. The attorney general is simply acting as a lawyer in this model. In practice, this relationship has been problematic. In the B.H. case discussed in the introduction, Fitzgerald's bill was an attempt to use this approval requirement as a fire alarm for the legislature. In a similar child welfare case in Missouri, the agency director met privately with plaintiffs'
counsel, and only informed the attorney general of the negotiation when announcing the agreement afterward (Bertelli 2004 ). Such strategic manipulation of the relationship suggests that it is not a sound measure of remedy if it complies with the law. If (1) the plaintiff rejects the offer, or (2) the judge refuses to endorse the plan, negotiation enters a second round.
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In the second round, the plaintiff makes an offer y ∈ R 2 , which the agency may accept or reject. If the agency accepts, then the plan is presented to the judge who endorses the plan if it complies with (his interpretation of) relevant law. Otherwise, the agency gets to make the proposal in the next round, etc. This process continues until a party accepts an offer that is endorsed by the judge.
However, in each round (defined as a point in time when a new offer can be made), the parties face an exogenous probability, π, that the judge terminates settlement negotiations by issuing an injunction, which sets the remedy at the disagreement point, c.
Let H τ denote the history of offers and rejections prior to round τ . A strategy for player i is a sequence of functions s 21 Why would the court allow the parties to engage in this specific type of bargaining (alternating-offer)?
In noncooperative game theory, the alternating offer procedure is one of several methods of eliminating the "divider's advantage" in fair division problems. By giving the plaintiff the opportunity not only to reject, but also to propose a counter-offer, the court eliminates the agency's divider's advantage.
Alternating-offer bargaining is not the only means of doing this, but it is similar to what courts have done in these cases. In comprehensive structural reform litigation, negotiation almost universally begins with the judge asking the agency to propose a plan for its own reform (Diver 1979 ). This plan is often prepared in consultation with a third party. A hearing, at which plaintiffs and the agency are present, is held to adopt the plan after negotiations occur. 
otherwise. The order of moves is represented in Figure 1 .
The decision rule of the policy neutral judge is equivalent to a constraint on feasible offers.
We will momentarily demonstrate the substantive effects of the requirement of obtaining the judge's approval on the bargaining outcome. But first, we characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game in the following proposition, and present its formal proof in the appendix.
Proposition 1.
For any π > 0, the above bargaining game has a subgame-perfect equilibrium with the following properties: There is a unique pair of policy alternatives, x * , y * ∈ L s.t.
(1) x * and y * are constrained Pareto efficient, and (2) the following equations are satisfied:
and
The equilibrium strategies are such that the agency always proposes x * and rejects any offer that yields utility less than u a (y * ), and the plaintiff always proposes y * and rejects any offer that yields less than u g (x * ). The judge applies the decision rule given above.
In light of the equilibrium strategies in Proposition 1, bargaining ends in the first period with the agency's legal offer, x * ∈ L, being accepted by the plaintiff and approved by the judge. The agency enjoys a slight advantage in making the first offer and having x * accepted instead of y * . This advantage becomes negligible as π → 0.
Effect of the Judicial Plan Approval on the Bargaining Outcome
We employ the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) to explore the properties and implications of the bargaining model with judicial approval. The NBS approximates the above equilibrium outcome and has the advantage that its simple algebraic form facilitates the analysis and provides a straightforward graphical representation. 22 Various authors have demonstrated the relationship between the strategic, or non-cooperative, approach to bargaining given by the alternating-offer bargaining game and the static, axiomatic approach represented by the NBS. In particular, as π → 0, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the alternating offer game, x * , converges to the NBS, x N (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky
1986, Proposition 5).
Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992, 1185) interpret the NBS in the following way.
Suppose the plaintiff resists x N by suggesting an alternative x that makes it better off, 22 The Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash 1953 ), x N ∈ X, is a policy alternative that satisfies a number of normative properties, viz., symmetry, Pareto optimality, scale invariance of the utility representation, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. x N is unique and maximizes the Nash product,
) (see Osborne and Rubinstein 1990 ).
knowing full well that this move could cause a breakdown in bargaining with some probability π. The optimal action for the agency is to insist on x N even though maintaining this position could also terminate negotiation with some probability π if and only if the expected utility from x N exceeds the certain utility from x , and similarly for the plaintiff. NBS to lie at the midpoint of the contract curve between the the two players' reservation utilities.
In the following section, we isolate two important configurations of agency and plaintiff preferences. In the second case, an empirically interesting incentive for collusion between agency and plaintiff arises. Note that in the case where both A and G lie within the set of illegal outcomes, an analysis similar the one presented in the cases below might be done, with the agency and plaintiff splitting the surplus beyond the disagreement outcome, c.
Additionally, if both the agency and plaintiff have ideal points which lie in the legal set of outcomes, then the agency's constrained maximization problem yields an outcome that cannot be challenged in court.
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Case I: Bargaining with a "private good" input The bold, kinked line in Figure 2 is the set of Pareto efficient points in X. Since the equilibrium bargaining outcome x * ≈ x N is efficient, it must lie on this line. Proposition 2 characterizes the location of the negotiated outcome subject to court approval. LetX be the unconstrained bargaining set, i.e., the entire lens-shaped region in Figure 2 , and letx N be the NBS when the outcome does not need to not satisfy the legal constraint. The presence of a tilde denotes reference to the unconstrained problem, which, given its unavailability to the litigants, should be viewed as benchmark only.
Proposition 2.
1. If the unconstrained Nash Bargaining Solutionx N lies in L, then the constrained bargaining outcome is x N =x N .
Ifx
N ∈ L, then p N =p, i.e., the constrained Nash Bargaining Solution lies on the legal boundary of the constrained Pareto set.
Proposition 2 states that whenever the unconstrained bargaining outcome is acceptable to the judge, it is identical to the outcome of the bargaining game with the legal constraint.
Conversely, if the unconstrained bargaining outcome is unacceptable to the judge, then the outcome of the constrained bargaining game must lie on the legal constraint. Since the legal constraint operates on p, there will be no concession on process by the agency in this case. A formal proof of Proposition 2 is presented in the appendix. An analysis of the distributional effects of the legal constraint presented in the next section elaborates the consequences of the legal constraint.
Case II: Bargaining with a "public good" input We have seen that the legal constraint on substantive policy procedure is more likely to affect the equilibrium bargaining outcome for the remedy if the quantifiable input is a public good, i.e., when the input does not directly, or only to a limited extent, benefit the agency.
This may seem surprising. However, when the input is primarily a private good, the agency is more willing to trade off procedure for additional resources.
Both cases of remedial bargaining, however, entail an improvement for both parties relative to the legislatively mandated policy c by violating the legislated constraint on q. As we shall see, the courts have been willing to approve structural reform of this sort by prioritizing the constitutional and statutory rights of agency clients over the legislative budget allocations (see Frug 1978) . In this sense, structural reform litigation creates an opportunity for interest or client groups to "collude" with the agency against the legislature's manifest interest.
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Distributional Effects of Legal Provisions
The necessity to obtain judicial approval for the remedial plan, i.e., the existence of a binding legal constraint, affects the distribution of surplus between the litigant parties. To show this, we employ a natural graphical representation of the spatial bargaining problem in the utility space. Figure 4 depicts the constrained and unconstrained utility possibility sets V andṼ ; each point in V (Ṽ ) represents the utility allocation to the agency on the horizontal axis and 25 Normative views on such collusion may differ, and we do not presently engage them. For example, Horowitz (1982, 138) casts such behavior in a distinctively negative light, stating that "a reforming judiciary can be a weapon in the hands of bureaucrats seeking to escape from political accountability." Alternatively, a view of courts as protecting disenfranchised minorities as in Carolene Products, fn. 4, might see such collusion as a way to circumvent a legislative debate that would give short shrift to the plaintiff's concerns.
to the plaintiff on the vertical axis for some policy in X (orX). Under A1, the frontier of the unconstrained utility possibility set is linear. 26 The Nash Bargaining Solution corresponds to the tangency point of the highest hyperbolah with the utility possibility set. In the unconstrained problem with linear utility, this pointṽ N lies at the midpoint of the Pareto frontier, whereupon the parties split the surplus evenly. The constrained utility possibility set is a subset ofṼ , as some of the agency's highest utility levels can no longer be achieved due to the requirement that p >p. The hatched region in Figure 4 depicts V . The figure illustrates Proposition 2: Ifṽ, which maximizes the Nash product for the unconstrained utility possibility set, is available in V , then it 26 Quadratic disutility functions, as often used in spatial model, would yield a strictly concave (unconstrained) utility possibility frontier.
clearly maximizes the Nash product for the constrained set. However, ifṽ lies outside the constrained set (as depicted in the figure), then the Nash product is maximized at a point v that must lie on the portion of V where the legal constraint is binding. Figure 4 also shows that with the requirement of judicial approval, the surplus is no longer split evenly. The constraint makes the agency necessarily worse off, whereas the plaintiff may be better off than if the parties bargained without the constraint. 27 The surplus for the two parties is not maximized whenever the legal requirement is binding at the bargaining outcome. In Figure 2 , inefficiency comes entirely at the agency's expense; the plaintiff is a net beneficiary. 28 However, when the constraint is tighter and further reduces the bargaining set, sufficient inefficiencies may emerge such that both agency and plaintiff are worse off than at the unconstrained solution. In such a case, both parties still benefit from litigation when compared with the minimal legislative mandate, c. During settlement bargaining, however, both would rather do away with the requirement of judicial approval, since a large portion of the joint surplus is unavailable to them under that condition.
The legal constraint, of course, also determines the default outcome when bargaining breaks down, c. If the constraintp moves toward p g , both constrained and unconstrained bargaining outcomes move toward G. Thus, ex ante, the plaintiff benefits directly from 27 The first part of the statement is easily shown: V shares its Pareto frontier withṼ on the unconstrained portion. Since V is convex it follows that the slope is steeper on the constrained than on the unconstrained portion of the boundary. Since the family of hyperbolas h is homothetic, the tangency with the hyperbola h <h must lie to the left ofṽ a wheneverṽ is not available. The second part of this statement is depicted in the figure; however, one can also construct an example in which v g <ṽ g .
28 There is a literature on plaintiffs' motivations in public law and other interest group litigation (e.g.,
Olson 1990).
existing law-specific statutes and precedential (or at least persuasive) case law-relating to process.
Once again, though we have relied on the Nash Bargaining Solution in deriving these results, the equilibrium of the extensive-form alternating offer game in Section 2.2 converges to the NBS as the probability of bargaining breakdown vanishes, so the results remain qualitatively identical.
Discussion
We have shown that an agency can improve its position relative to minimal, but faithful, compliance with its legislated mandate by (1) violating the mandate, (2) being sued, and given that the enforcement of the mandate by the courts is biased and extremely difficult to surmount.
The direction and magnitude of drift induced by negotiated consent decrees depends significantly on the agency's preferences over quantifiable input and process choices. In the private good input case, i.e., where the agency benefits more directly from additional resources than does the client, the agency is, somewhat ironically, more willing to accede to the plaintiff's process claims. A consent decree provides the basis for additional funding for its present and future operations, and these resources compensate the agency for substantive The contrast between these scenarios suggests several empirical implications: a) Structural reform cases in which there is little scope to compensate the agency in some other dimension for process concessions seem more adversarial. We expect discord to ensue in these cases with regard to the minimal process requirements of the law (the location of "L").
b) An optimal strategy for the plaintiff (or for the judge) to achieve cooperation among the litigants is to identify a mechanism (such as the "private good input" in our generic setup) to compensate the agency for process concessions.
c) Independent of the ostensible degree of collusion between the litigants, the nature of remedial bargaining implies agency drift from minimal statutory compliance that is mutually beneficial to the litigants.
Our third prediction clearly distinguishes enforcement through remedial bargaining from the resolution of a third-party enforcement problem in a principal-agent relationship. Once 29 The effect in each case is more pronounced the steeper the contract curve between the litigants: in the public good case, steepness induces a decrease in the scope for bargaining on process and reduces the equilibrium payoff to the agency, while in the private good case, the agency would make larger process concessions.
an agency is sued, bargaining leads to policy drift, and the more agency and plaintiff preferences complement each other in their divergence from legislative intent, the more costly the settlement outcome becomes for the legislature.
Adding litigation costs
The analysis thus far abstracts from any costs of litigation (e.g., filing, lawyers, experts, etc.).
In the complete information bargaining setup, litigation costs will be sunk at the negotiation stage, affecting ex post payoffs, but not the bargaining outcome. An interest group will, therefore, only sue on behalf of a client class if its expected benefits from the negotiated outcome exceed litigation costs. 30 Litigation costs exceeding this threshold allow the agency to violate its mandate with no threat of structural reform litigation. Violations are immune to suit to the extent that the loss to the group, relative to the negotiated bargaining outcome, does not exceed the litigation costs. Thus, for any level of litigation cost there is a maximal litigation-proof violation; if the agency prefers the outcome of this violation to the bargaining outcome of litigation, it will choose it. If the negotiated settlement is preferable, then the agency will violate the mandate beyond the litigation-proof point and trigger a lawsuit, which leads to the bargaining outcome. In either case the agency is better off than with minimal compliance with the statutory mandate (at c). 30 Litigation costs for interest groups in structural reform cases are large, including not only pecuniary, but also political-even physical-costs. Southern social and political resistance to integrated schools, for example, was overwhelming, and the strategy of the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund was designed to keep the political costs as low as possible. By initially pursuing litigation in arenas less directly tied to widespread invidious discrimination-graduate schools-the interest group was able to contain litigation costs while establishing legal precedents for the fight against discrimination in public primary education (Kluger 1977) .
Multiple interest groups
Another complication we have avoided is the presence of multiple interest groups, each willing and able to sue. Several possibilities arise. First, the groups can unify their efforts such that their bargaining behavior reflects some negotiated aggregate of their disparate preferences.
Second, there may be free riding among the groups, with each expecting another group to incur the costs of litigation while costlessly benefiting from the outcome.
Second, groups may observe each other's behavior over time, but they presumably lack the punishment mechanisms to enforce cooperation. Thus, litigation may be delayed. If one group eventually does file the suit, others may then have an incentive to influence the bargaining outcome by filing amicus briefs that suggest to the judge particular interpretations of the agency's statutory and constitutional mandate. Assuming that amicus briefs are costly, groups with preferences identical to the plaintiff should not file a brief, and allow plaintiff to do their bidding in the bargaining process.
Third, one possible consequence of this free-riding is specialization among interest groups.
Groups like the American Civil Liberties Union or Children's Rights, Inc. are lawyers' groups focusing primarily on litigation strategies, while other groups pursue their common policy interests in other arenas (such as legislative lobbying). Related to this division of labor is twotiered lobbying, which would occur when interest groups first successfully lobby the legislature for legislation that supports their position. Then, to the extent that the implementation of this legislation does not meet their interests, these groups recruit a class of plaintiffs to sue the agency charged with implementing the legislation. In this way, interest groups can circumvent portions of legislation with which they do not agree, change agency mandates by bargaining directly with the administration, and build constituencies for programs and initiatives that, absent court involvement, could not be built. We have not explored the full consequences of this behavior for policy design and outcomes, but consider it an interesting avenue for further research.
Conclusions
We have shown that structural reform litigation can be used by interest groups and administrative agencies to achieve mutually favorable outcomes that contradict legislative intent.
The divergence of legislative preferences and court enforcement relies on the notion that courts, when approving remedial consent decrees, do not consider the same trade-offs, budgetary and otherwise, as the legislature in its ex ante attempts to achieve political control over the agency. In particular, when deciding a case or approving a consent decree, courts do not consider the full range of policy issues that generate debate in legislatures and the polity at large. Courts defer for these trade-offs to the parties of the dispute, citing the limitations of substituting judicial judgment for administrative expertise. However, the agency and plaintiffs focus on an extremely limited scope of governance activities as compared with the legislature. All of this has important consequences for policy design.
Our analysis has broader implications beyond public litigation. Since mass torts, shareholder derivative actions, enforcement of environmental statutes, civil rights cases, and other important classes of litigation are frequently settled by negotiating consent decrees, incentives exist for similar strategic behavior to that exhibited in public law litigation. These issues are left for future investigation.
offer strictly below v g .
Since v and v are on the Pareto frontier, the corresponding policies x * and y * are unique.
Proof of Proposition 2
For brevity, denote u i (x) by v i and u i (c) by z i , i = a, g. Thenx N maximizes the Nash product h(x) = (v a − z a )(v g − z g ) onX.
(1.) Ifx N ∈ L, thenx N also maximizes h(x) on X, since X =X ∩ L. Thus,x N = x N .
(This also follows immediately from the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" axiom, or contraction consistency property, of the Nash bargaining solution.)
Recall that the unconstrained and the constrained utility possibility sets,Ṽ and V , are convex. We first show that h(x) reaches a unique maximum on the Pareto frontier ofṼ (and V ) and decreases uniformly in either direction along the respective Pareto set. We then show that x N ∈ interior(X)
Let v g = ψ(v a ) be the Pareto frontier of a convex set V , and normalize the disagreement utilities z i to zero. The Nash product for any point on the Pareto frontier is then given by h(v a ) = v a · ψ(v a ). Since ψ(·) is strictly decreasing and concave, we have ψ < 0 and ψ < 0, and hence h = 2ψ + v a ψ < 0 , i.e., the Nash product is strictly concave along the Pareto frontier. Since the Pareto frontier maps one-to-one into the Pareto set, h(·) reaches a unique maximum atx N (or x N ) and decreases in either direction.
Note that in the interior of L, the constrained and unconstrained Pareto sets coincide.
To see this, suppose x N is in the interior of L, which implies that x N is a local maximum of h(x) on the unconstrained Pareto set ⇒x N = x N ∈ L, a contradiction.
